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Admissions: A Time for Change
by RONALD C. GRIFFIN*
Law schools are revered institutions. In America, they have
had several missions: to nurture the values of society; to transmit
these values to new generations; and to teach young people market-
able skills.' In recent times law schools have inherited a new
function-to suggest and experiment with solutions to our social
problems. Assuming that is so (and the education of thousands of
minority students is one of those problems), the questions presented
are: what solutions have they proposed and to what extent have
community concerns thwarted what the law schools have tried to
implement.
The answers to these questions are difficult to assemble.
Important cases contain useful suggestions but no ultimate answers
or final solutions. If answers are to be tendered at all, their discov-
ery requires an examination and evaluation of the market we serve.
Answers should emerge if a distillation of community concerns takes
place.
I
Let us proceed from that premise. In 1958, Michael Young
wrote the fable, The Rise of the Meritocracy,' in which he described
the transformation of a society based upon merit into one based upon
something else. Each man's place was fixed by his intelligence and
* B.S., Hampton Institute, 1965; J.D. Howard University, 1968; LLM, Univer-
sity of Virginia, 1974. Assistant Professor of Law; University of Oregon.
1. American universities have several missions: to nurture the values of our
civilization, to transmit these values to new generations, to teach young people
marketable skills. Since law schools are an integral part of university life, what
is said about universities presumably applies to them as well. Duncan, Higher Edu-
cation: The Effort to Adjust, 99 Daedalus 143 (1970); Luria, The Role of the
University: Ivory Tower, Service Station, or Frontier Post?, 99 Daedalus 76-77
(1970); Throw, Reflections on the Transition from Mass to Universal Higher Edu-
cation, 99 Daedalus 2-4 (1970). See Packer and Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal
Education, Appendix 1, 164-65 (1972); Wolff, The Ideal of the University 3-4, 9
(1969); Thode, Introduction to the Study of Law 1-4 (1970).
2. Bell, Meritocracy and Equality, 29 Pub. Int. 29 (1972).
effort. All adults with an IQ above 125 belonged to the Meritoc-
racy.3 Those lacking the requisite IQ did not.
This arrangement created problems. Talent previously distrib-
uted throughout the society was now concentrated in one group.
The inner group paraded the markings of acceptance, while the
outer group bore the stigma of rejection.' A revolt was inevitable.
When it came, the leaders (intelligent women confined to household
tasks) demanded equality between the sexes and equality for all. 5
Abundant life, they insisted, was not to be determined by this-or-
that mathematical test. Men and women were to be free to develop
their lives as they saw fit, in accordance with their God-given gifts.6
The revolters won and the meritocracy came to an end.
This vignette is a mirror image of a condition now prevailing
in the United States. If a women's revolt is inspired by a meritoc-
racy, and one is in progress in the United States, prognostically
speaking the United States has a meritocracy. If talent is unevenly
distributed in a meritocracy, and that observation corresponds with
the observed condition in the United States, our country harbors a
meritocracy.
In a meritocracy, the allocation of social rewards and the assign-
ment of status both rest on the assumption that there is a close con-
nection between achievement and intelligence.7 Talented individ-
uals are consigned to small groups. In crises, they are called to the
top to share their talents with others. Under this arrangement, ques-
tions about intelligence become important. Is intelligence inherited?
Can one raise intelligence by nurture? What do standardized tests
actually measure? Can one separate inherent ability from improve-
ment in skills acquired through education?
Herrnstein, a professor at Harvard University, is instructive.
Using the data assembled by Arthur Jensen, 8 he maintains:
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 30.
6. A theoretician of the Technician's Party had argued that marriage partners,
in the national interest, should consult the intelligence register. A high I.Q. man
who mated with a low I.Q. woman was presumed to have wasted his genes. The
activist women, on the other hand, took romance as their banner and beauty as their
flag, arguing that marriage should be based upon attraction. Their favorite slogan
was, "Beauty is achievable by all." Id. at 30, n.1.
7. Id. at 31.
8. See Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement,
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If success in society depends upon superior ability, and if
all unfavorable environmental factors are removed, social re-
wards will be the function of inherited differences. [In a
democracy] all people are entitled to an equal start. If equal
opportunity is fully realized, heredity will be the decisive factor
in all things of consequence. 9
This idea is unquestionably attractive. However, as adopted by
law schools, it becomes alarmingly dangerous and unattractive. How
is a law school to respond to applicants-particularly Blacks and
Chicanos-who fare poorly on the law school aptitude test? Should
these tests be ignored? Should minority students, disadvantaged by
education or opportunity, be accepted on faith alone? Is the
aptitude test the only instrument to be used when evaluating those
persons for legal training?1"
The landmark case of Defunis v. Odegaard" contains one insti-
tution's response to the questions posed above, as well as the State
of Washington's response to those same questions. The state trial
court announced that the preferential admissions program adopted
37 Harv. Ed. Rev. 1 (1969); Jensen, Selection of Minority Students in Higher Edu-
cation, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 403. Jensen insists that eighty percent of a person's
I.Q. is inherited, while environmental factors account for twenty percent. For a criti-
cal evaluation of these assertions as they apply to blacks, see Edsall and Deutch,
The Meritocracy Scare, 9 Society 71 (1971); Epps, Race, Intelligence, and Learning:
Some Consequences of the Misuse of Test Results, 34 Phylon 153 (1973); Morgan,
Myths and Reality of IQ Scores, 4 Black Scholar 28 (1973); Silberman, Crisis in
Black and White, 257-61 (1964).
9. Supra note 2, at 32.
10. At the outset, the limited but crucial function of the LSAT must be clearly
understood. It is a specially designed tool to predict the student's likelihood of suc-
cess in the first year of law school. It is not designed to measure his innate intellec-
tual gifts, nor to measure his ultimate potential as a lawyer. Instead, it seeks to
measure his present ability to pursue law school work. Summers, Preferential Ad-
missions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 377, 390
[hereinafter cited as Summers]. See Consalus, The Law School Admissions Test
and the Minority Student, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 511, 514-15. Nevertheless, some
insist that this test and comparable tests prove the innate inferiority of blacks. Pro-
fessor Tollett wrote this response: "The short answer to Jensen and Herrnstein is
that the dominant class will inevitably define the elements of intelligence in terms
of their own developed skills and attributes. . . . Even the kindred culture of Eng-
land is apparently disadvantaged by American . . . tests." Tollett, The Viability
and Reliability of the U.S. Supreme Court as an Institution for Social Change and
Progress Benejicial to Blacks, 3 Black L.J. 5, 21 (1973). Others argue that the
test itself is unfair. Note, Racial Bias and the LSAT: A New Approach to the
Defense of Preferential Admissions, 25 Buff. L. Rev. 439, 451-62 (1975).
11. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1975), dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312
(1974). Some claim that the opinion is a challenging essay and little else. See
also, Defunis v. Odegaard, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438, 448 (1975).
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by the University of Washington Law School violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 The state supreme
court, however, decided differently. It announced that the admis-
sions program was wholly consonant with equal protection, and that
adequate justification had been tendered to overcome the serious
objections raised under the fourteenth amendment.13
Are racial classifications permissible under the Constitution of
the United States? As yet, there is no definitive answer. There are
several arguments, however, that bear study. In my judgment, they
point the way to an answer that we may in the future come to accept:
A. Generally speaking, the equal protection clause permits
-in education and elsewhere-no use of race or ethnicity whatso-
ever. Assuming we are presented with a case in higher education
where documented proof establishes that a racial classification was
used in an admissions process, that admissions process should be con-
demned as inconsistent with the mandate prescribed by the Constitu-
tion.
14
B. As a matter of practice, officials administering the public
trust are prohibited by law from engaging in unreasonable dis-
crimination. To deny a state benefit to an applicant who happens
to belong to other-than-the-preferred race is discrimination which is
rightly defined as "unreasonable discrimination," and, therefore, a
kind of discrimination prohibited by law.' 5
C. If a racial classification favors a previously despised and
rejected group, the classification is then beyond the constraints of
the fourteenth amendment. All the important cases, counting for-
ward from Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma'
6
to Brown v. Board of Education,'17 have dealt with invidious discrim-
ination-conscious attempts on the part of some Americans to deny
to other Americans certain state benefits solely on the basis of race.
There is a clear difference between a classification which produces
12. Defunis v. Odegaard, Civ. No. 741727, Superior Court of King County,
Washington (Sept. 22, 1971), reprinted in 57 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1971).
13. 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (Wash. 1973).
14. E.g., Bakke v. The Regents of the University of California, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976). Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Order to Show Cause and Alternative Writ of Mandate (June 15, 1974).
15. This view emerged from a conversation with Paul Haskell, Professor of Law,
Franklin T. Backus School of Law, Case Western Reserve University, on Aug. 1,
1975.
16. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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this mischief, and one that does not. Assuming a real case where
the classification produces something other than malicious mischief,
the classification should stand. Courts should declare the Sipuels
and the Browns inapposite.
D. In an historic sense, is a racial classification suspect when
it favors any group which has borne the brunt of past injustice?
Cannot majority Americans be trusted when they discriminate
against themselves? If the fourteenth amendment was erected to
establish and guarantee civil equality for Blacks, and by extension
to protect other disadvantaged groups, would it not disavow the very
purpose of that amendment to use it as a device to strike down
measures designed to achieve real equality under the law within the
United States?' 8
No single argument will produce an acceptable answer. Some
suspect that a consensus is lacking as to those arguments which
should be combined to yield an acceptable answer. If those
suspicions prove correct, perhaps further exploration will uncover
grounds on which we can all stand-a vantage point where each ar-
gument can be affirmatively addressed.
Michael Moorhead, a professor of law at Howard University
Law School, points the way. He makes the observation that law
schools make a mistake when they equate depersonalization with ob-
jectivity in their admissions process. 9 "Depersonalization," he says,
"makes it possible for admissions people to overlook applicants who
might be qualified for legal training." Studies indicate that the pro-
file for the average minority candidate differs from the profile for
the average white candidate. Professor Moorhead suggests it is this
variance which makes a difference in the decisions arrived at by ad-
missions offices. Law schools, he says, should begin to take sound-
ings for applicants who are "achievers in the face of adversity.
'2
How does one do that?
Law schools could build a goal or profile-system into their
admissions process. As an illustration, a school could say to the
public, "We declare the following to be our goals:
18. Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of Benign Racial Preferences in Law School
Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 566-71 (1975). See also Bittker, The Case for
Black Reparation, 110-12 (1973); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimi-
nation, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974).
19. Memorandum from Michael J. Moorhead to the Honorable George N. Leigh-
ton, Aug. 1, 1975.
20. Id. at 7.
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"(a) To offer graduate education to students of merit;
"(b) To provide competent lawyers for professional roles;
"(c) To contribute to needed societal roles in which law is
relevant."
Thereafter, the school could convert these goals into factors in
a formula used to screen candidates. Points could be assigned to
each factor; for instance, for demonstrated or probable merit
(LSAT), for evidence disclosing an applicant's interest in fulfilling
a professional role, and for evidence (prompted by race or sex) dis-
closing an applicant's interest in assuming a needed societal role in
which law is relevant. The formula could be constructed to yield
100 points. If the points were distributed evenly (331/3 points for
each of the three factors), applicants with diverse or previously
under-represented backgrounds would have access to the law school.
The "profile" system is seemingly the easiest to implement.2'
A law school could poll its non-white graduates, make an assessment
of their "success," and by comparing individual backgrounds with
their measure of achievement, draw certain measurable conclusions
about those accomplishments-particularly in relation to those who
were "achievers in the face of adversity." If, in a relative sense,
certain of these individuals have out-stripped their classmates whose
earliest academic records were superior by conventional standards,
a valuable standard for comparison might be established. Assuming
non-white applicants are found whose profiles correspond with
successful minority graduates, the law school's admissions committee
could select them for entrance. This approach, of course, will work
in some law schools but not in others. Some institutions will have
an inadequate pool from which to extrapolate what candidates with
similar profiles will do. Nevertheless, this suggested solution is use-
ful. Assuredly, there will be no end to racial and ethnic discussions
until we develop a meaningful resolution-of-disputes model, free of
such references, to replace the outmoded admissions systems now
in use.
22
Time and equity demand that we change the way we approach
our academic business. Cases construing the Constitution suggest
21. See Delunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 340-41 (1974).




that a resolution of past inequities must be achieved without further
delay.
Can good come from adopting a goal or profile system?
Suppose good is defined as the ideal. If the ideal in Oregon-or
anywhere for that matter-is that everyone should have access to the
services of an attorney, and Blacks more than Whites lack such
access, then any program designed to approximate the ideal is
"good."
Minority lawyers are drastically underrepresented in the legal
profession. 28  Furthermore, such attorneys are noticeably absent in
those areas where the need for services is the greatest. 24  Despite
impressive efforts to enroll minority applicants, the proportion of mi-
nority students in law school remains far below the minority share
of the population.25 If something other than preferential admissions
were capable of correcting the imbalance-if universities could pro-
duce a great number of well-qualified minority students-preferen-
tial admissions as an approach to the problem would be unnecessary.
For a variety of reasons, however, nothing short of that can do the
job.
What is the reality? While 11.4% of the national population is
Black, barely 1.2% of the legal profession is Black 6 If the size of the
23. Statistical Abstracts for the United States 26, 361 (1975). Blacks constitute
11.4% of the population. About 1.2% of the legal profession is Black. Figures
for other minority groups are also disquieting. Americans of Spanish descent are
4.4 percent of the population. They are 0.9 percent of the legal profession. One
census count shows that 800,000 American Indians live in the United States. They
are 0.4 percent of the population, yet the nation can boast of only 310 Indian attor-
neys (0.1 percent of all lawyers), 1970 Census Subject Reports: Occupational Char-
acteristics, Table 39. See Report of the Advisory Committee for the Minority Group
Study, (1) 1967 Proceedings of the American Association of Law Schools 160
(1967), quoted in O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equal Access to Legal Educa-
tion, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 295 [hereinafter cited as O'Neill.
24. Parker and Stebman, Legal Education for Blacks, 407 Annals. 144, 154
(1973).
25. Id. at 147. Justice Douglas has argued that "The purpose of the University
. . . cannot be to produce black lawyers for blacks . . . [but] to produce good law-
yers for Americans." 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974). Realistically, it is inappropriate
for a school to produce black lawyers for blacks, in the sense of exacting a commit-
ment from Black applicants to serve Black communities upon graduation. But given
the times, who will speak for them? If the integration of American life is an impor-
tant social goal, eloquent voices representing a culture and a set of experiences hith-
erto hidden from the majority must speak out. See Karst and Horowitz, Affirmative
Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955 (1974).
26. Supra note 23. For a general discussion about black lawyers see Shuman,
A Black Lawyer's Study, 16 How. L.J. 225 (1971); Leonard, The Development of
the Black Bar, 407 Annals. 135 (1973).
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profession could be kept constant, an additional 30,000 black lawyers
would be needed to achieve parity.17  As disheartening as these
figures may be, geographical distribution figures tell us something
even more disquieting. Seventeen percent of all black lawyers prac-
tice in the South, where fifty percent of the black population
resides. 28  Mississippi has a non-white population of nearly a million
serviced by 54 black lawyers.29 In Georgia there are 58 lawyers for
a black community of 1.2 million residents." In states where the
total number of minority lawyers is larger-Virginia, for example-
they tend to concentrate in the cities, leaving rural areas (where
many Blacks live) without local representation."a Actual underrep-
resentation is far more critical than overall figures might suggest.
Figures, of course, provide one important perspective; relevant
questions provide another. Those questions are: Can a shortage of
lawyers seriously disadvantage a minority group, and if so, do ade-
quate alternatives exist to meet the undoubted need for legal serv-
ices? Several factors bear study. First, all surveys of the need for
counsel confirm the fact that poor people--of whom Blacks consti-
tute a disproportionate part82 -find legal services inaccessible, in-
adequate, or both. The 1965 report to the National Conference on
Law and Poverty3  identified four reasons why the poor do not have,
and often do not seek the advice or aid of an attorney:
(a) The poor man does not know that an attorney can help;
(b) . . . [He] does not know where to get legal help;
(c) . . . [He] finds the lawyer remote;
(d) . . . [He] is afraid of reprisals.
3 4
The report notes that private lawyers do not serve a substantial
segment of the poor. In New York City, for example, where half
the residents have an income below $5,000, five percent of the bar
reported the median income of their clients below that amount.
35
27. Gellhorn, The Law School and the Negro, 1968 Duke L.J. 1069.
28. O'Neil supra, note 23 at 295.
29. Conversation with Elihu M. Harris, Executive Director, National Bar As-
sociation, December 7, 1976.
30. Id.
31. O'Neil, supra note 23 at 295-96.
32. Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 631 (1974).
33. Law and Poverty 1965: Report to the National Conference on Law and
Poverty 1 (1965).
34. Id. at 42-6.
35. Id. at 44.
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This portrait has a parallel in rural communities. A survey of
several North Carolina counties conducted under the auspices of the
American Bar Association, disclosed a critical lack of available legal
services, and a feeling by some that where services were available
they were made inaccessible by Whites.3" Other studies confirmed
this finding. Where the case was controversial or devisive along
racial lines, white lawyers were neither able nor willing to take the
case.
3 7
Black lawyers can correct that. The capacity of black law
schools to produce such lawyers, however, is shrouded in doubt.3 s
Consider Texas Southern and similar law schools. For the sake of
analysis, let us assume that Texas Southern lost its accreditation.
What impact would that have upon legal education for black
students, and upon legal services in those communities where it is
needed? The answer is clear. The closing of that school would lead
to a reduction in the number of students studying law, a reduction
in the number of graduates practicing law, a reduction in the number
of lawyers available to render legal services in those communities
where it is needed. That is what we face. Black schools are drift-
ing dangerously close to the precipice. Florida A & M Law School
is gone; South Carolina State Law School is gone; Texas Southern
may face the same fateA9 Although Howard University School of
Law is a far larger and stronger institution than any of those pre-
viously mentioned, a gradual equalization of the racial mix in that
school will limit the number of spaces available to black students. 40
Clearly, black law schools can supply some lawyers, but not the num-
ber needed to do the job.
Paraprofessionals could be used as an interim remedy. Their
talents could be martialed to serve the community until a sufficient
36. See Project-The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, 1969 Duke L.J. 495,
523, cited in O'Neil, supra note 23 at 297.
37. See Commentary, Negro Members of the Alabama Bar, 21 Ala. L. Rev.
306, 330 n.78 (1969).
38. O'Neil, supra note 23, at 307-8. Compare C. Jencks and D. Riesman, The
Academic Revolution 437 (rev. ed. 1969) with Carl, The Shortage of Negro Law-
yers: Pluralistic Legal Education and Legal Services for the Poor, 20 J. Legal Ed.
21, 31-2 (1967). See also Memorandum to the Council of the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar, from the Accreditation Committee, on South-
ern University School of Law (January 17, 1975).
39. O'Neil, supra note 23, at 307.
40. O'Neil, supra note 23, at 308.
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number of lawyers became available.4' Unfortunately, few well-
conceived programs exist to produce the necessary personnel.
42
Several law schools have undertaken training programs: Columbia,
Denver and West Los Angeles." Of the three, West Los Angeles
has the only reported program in actual operation.
4 4
Justice in education requires discrimination in reverse. Some
can comfortably live with that thought.4 5  Frequently, however,
there are periods of doubt. The disquiet is prompted by many
things: the moral society we hope for, as against the one we fear
may come to pass. There are countless possibilities. They range
from a revolutionary division of the population of the United States
into fully autonomous racial groups, to a pre-1954 segregated society,
to a fully uniracial society following some moral revolt.
This comment is certainly no place to describe in detail the full
range of possibilities, nor to analyze the likely relationships between
each and the programs proposed for law schools. However, it is an
appropriate vehicle to illustrate the edge of a complexity and to
reveal the excruciating difficulty which individuals, groups and
institutions experience in their attempt to balance competing
interests.
In the real world, a claim is being made by black Americans,
disadvantaged by education and color, that their participation in the
"defense of democracy" abroad gives them an unqualified right to
receive benefits from benefit-conferring institutions like law schools.
Some Americans who speak for law schools dismiss this. Others,
of course, urge law schools to use race as a component in some cases.
Ideally, if those most concerned could bargain, an agreement
could be made in which both parties would realize a gain without
either party sustaining a loss.46  What would be at the heart of the
41. See, e.g., Brown, Preventive Law and the Legal Assistant, 24 Vand. L.
Rev. 1181 (1971); Fry, A Short Review of the Paralegal Movement, 7 Clearing-
house Rev. 463 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fry].
42. Fry, supra note 41, at 469. See also Fry, Emerging Work of Paralegals:
Florida Legal Services Paralegal Project, 48 Fla. B.J. 742 (1974).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: Special Programs for
Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional Criteria, 1970 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 321 [hereinafter cited as Rosen].
46. See generally, J. Buchanan, The Economics of Legal Relationships, 67
(1975); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law and Econ. 1 (1960); Demsetz,
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agreement? That law schools refrain from using race in all cases?
That law schools use race in some cases? If the first view is adopted,
law schools will realize a gain, but black Americans will not. Assur-
edly, race will be eliminated as a consideration, but other conditions
restricting admissions and the award of degrees, established by the
institutions and perhaps harmful to minorities, will not. If the
second view is adopted-that law schools use race in some cases-
both parties realize a gain. Race will be promoted as a special justi-
fication for admitting Blacks and conferring degrees, while other
conditions restricting the award of degrees will go untouched.
One view is clearly more desirable than the other. Assuming
desirability is assigned to the view which promotes a basic concern
of the United States-and the realization of group and industrial
expectations is one concern-the second view is clearly more desir-
able.
Fortunately, the analysis must go beyond that. We need to
know whether there is some identity between a desire in the ideal
world and a rule rooted in reality; and assuming there is a rule, we
need to know whether its implementation will cost this society more
than the benefits to be derived therefrom. Bolling v. Sharp47 and
Korematsu v. United States48 tell us that racial classifications are con-
stitutionally suspect. Loving v. Virginia4" tells us that such classifi-
cations will pass constitutional scrutiny if they are accompanied by
a "compelling state interest." Arguably, if a compelling state
interest refers to the state's interest in eliminating the effects of
adverse racial classifications theretofore imposed, a showing of that
will justify the use of race in admitting Blacks to law school." If
a compelling state interest refers to an overriding interest in promot-
ing and executing the laws of the United States which includes,
among other things, the promotion of integration in public higher
education, a showing of that will justify the use of race in admitting
Blacks to law school.
5 1
Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967); Turvey, Di-
vergencies Between Social Costs and Private Costs, 30 Economics 309 (1963).
47. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
48. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See Bickel and Kurland,
Delunis Is Moot-The Issue Is Not, 1 Learning and the Law 16 (Summer 1974).
51. Supreme Court cases establish that absent overriding considerations, all per-
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The benefits derived from implementing either rule will far
exceed the cost to this society. There will be fewer white lawyers:
white expectations vis-a-vis law schools will be lowered, and of
course, marginal institutions will go under for lack of support. The
gains are many: the ranks of black lawyers will swell; black commu-
nities will acquire additional and, perhaps, eloquent spokesmen for
their points of view before deliberative bodies; larger numbers of
disputes between Blacks and Whites will be resolved by the written
word as opposed to those formerly resolved by violence; increasing
numbers of Blacks will come to respect and support white institu-
tions. Lastly, classic standards so dear to institutions of higher learn-
ing will go untouched.
IV
Assuming law schools are free to admit Blacks without reserva-
tion, how will they select those students who will be successful?
What standards, other than a goal or profile approach, are usable
to indicate qualities of personality-evident in those who have over-
come obstacles which formerly deterred Blacks from entering higher
education?
sons within a state are entitled to equal access to benefits and opportunities dis-
tributed by the state. Statistics can play the vital role of showing that all persons
have not enjoyed equal access. The use of statistical information to establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination has long been recognized as constitutionally valid.
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The validity of this approach
was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Scotland Neck
Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407
U.S. 541 (1972). For discussion and application of this approach to race relations,
see Nisenbaum, Race Quotas, 8 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 128, 131-
41 (1973). The gross statistical disparities described in the text show a massive
differential distribution of a societal benefit-access to public, legal education-ac-
cording to race and a breach of the principle of distributive justice. Courts have
held in such circumstances that the denial of equal access warrants the inference
of discrimination, and that when a prima facie case of discrimination is presented,
the burden falls upon the State to overcome it. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559
(1953). If the state fails to produce positive evidence directly contradicting the
prima facie case, a court will hold that no such evidence exists. . . . Patton v. Mis-
sissippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); accord, Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). See
also Keyes v. School Dist No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Thus, unless the state pro-
duces the necessary evidence, the gross statistical disparity of access to legal educa-
tion would be seen by a court as a mandatory presumption requiring a holding of
a violation of equal protection of the laws and a court could prescribe a racial quota-
like remedy. Thus, the law school could be under a constitutional duty to use a
racially conditioned preferential admission policy. Morris, Equal Protection, Af-
firmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions: DeFunis v. Odegaard,
49 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 39 n.138 (1973).
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The traditional admissions criteria for all law schools is
performance on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) and college
grades.5 2  The LSAT strives to measure skills essential for the study
of law, such as reading, writing and abstract analysis." Assuming
all disadvantaged students take the LSAT and complete college,
selection of a particular law school ought to turn on the credentials
the student presents. Clyde Summers is instructive. 4  There are
163 ABA accredited law schools in the United States.5 5  Each year
they admit approximately 39,038 students. Although admission
standards are based upon undergraduate grades and LSAT scores,
the level of those standards varies from school to school. 6 If a law
school admits applicants who have earned B-averages and 450 LSAT
scores, black applicants who present that profile should be admitted
to that school. Conversely, if black applicants cannot present that
profile, each should consider schools where the standards are not
so high.57
There are other approaches. 58  A law school could institute a
special compensatory program, making acceptance of a disadvan-
taged student contingent upon his participation in or satisfactory com-
pletion of the program. 9 Under this approach, the degree of risk
undertaken by the law school is reduced. The admissions office
receives an assurance in the form of the program director's certifica-
52. Graglia, Special Admission of the 'Culturally Deprived' to Law School,
119 U. Penn. L. Rev. 351, 358 (1970).
53. Id. See Rosen at 325-331.
54. Summers, supra note 10.
55. These figures are based upon a conversation with James P. White, Consultant
for the Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, American Bar As-
sociation, on December 16, 1975. See also, Law School and Admissions Require-
ments: A Review of Legal Education in the United States 41 (1975).
56. Summers supra note 10, at 382. See Brief for the Association of American
Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 3, Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
57. Id. at 383. Paul Haskell, a Professor at Case Western Reserve University,
expressed a similar view. Haskell, Legal Education on the Academic Plantation,
60 A.B.A.J. 203 (1974). Compare Bell, In Defense of Minority Admissions Pro-
grams: A Response to Professor Graglia, 119 U. Penn. L. Rev. 364 (1970). See
also Edwards, A New Role for Black Law Graduates-A Reality or an Illusion,
69 Mich. L. Rev. 1407, 1419-1422 (1971).
58. E.g., where the refusal to consider black applicants is hatched in prejudice,
and perpetuated by an unbiased inability of a decision-making body to evaluate them,
the decision-making body should be enlarged to include members of the excluded
group. Candidates should be limited to those necessary to alter the immediate dis-
criminatory practice. New members should be selected from those who are hired,
promoted and given tenure under a school's affirmative action plan.
59. Rosen at 338.
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tion that the participating student has shown the capacity to do law
school work.6"
Assuming a student has been admitted to law school, what
happens next? If a student has performed poorly on the LSAT, it
may be reasonable to assume that his linguistic or logical skills are
wanting. Operating on that assumption, law schools committed to
disadvantaged students could give additional work in language
development. The students themselves should be prepared to
undertake extensive and concentrated courses encompassing written
and oral language skills. Several types of programs geared to
strengthening these basic weaknesses are presently being tested.
Pittsburgh and Stanford, for example, have conducted "stretch"
programs."'
The Pittsburgh program is disarmingly simple. A disadvantaged
student bearing admission credentials considerably below the stand-
ards usually required for admission is admitted to the law school on
the condition that he take the three-year law program in four years.
Initially, the student carries a lighter load than is customary. After
his first year in the program, his performance is evaluated. If his
record shows that he can do the work and presumably compete on
an even footing with his contemporaries, he is permitted to accelerate
and to graduate after three and a half years of study.
62
Drake Law School has a similar program. It is called pre-
start.6 3 Students not meeting the normal admissions requirements
are offered the opportunity to attend a summer session of eight
weeks as conditional non-degree students. If their performance in
two law school subjects is C plus or better, they are admitted to the
60. Id.
61. Id. at 357-58. Unfortunately, Stanford University has discontinued its
"stretch". program. The Dean advised me that their program was discontinued at
the request of black students. I hasten to add, however, that the school does have
a minority admissions program, but the Dean expressed some reservation in light of
Bakke. Bakke v. Regents of The University of California, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553
P.2d 1152 (1976). Under the new program, there is a floor on the kind of student
this institution will admit. If the floor is 1300 PFYA (Predicted First Year Ave-
rage), for example, then minority applicants within 50 points will be considered for
admissions. Conversation with Dean Charles Meyers, Stanford University Law
School, November 22, 1976.
62. Id. at 357.
63. Id. at 354. For similar programs, see Kelly, Rogers and Bern, Summer
Preparatory Program: University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, 1970
U. Tol. L. Rev. 891; Murry, The Tryout System, 21 J. Legal Ed. 317 (1969).
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law school in the fall as degree candidates. Full credit towards a
degree is given for the courses taken in the summer. 4
Howard University Law School has perhaps the best pro-
gram. 6  The school has taken the position that the best way to
determine whether a student is fit for legal training is to admit him,
and evaluate him on the basis of his performance.6" That means,
that the school is concerned about the student and the positive impact
the institution's methods of instruction and environment have upon
his learning process." The Paul Diggs Communication Skills Pro-
gram,6" as it is called, has as its purpose to improve the writing and
speaking skills of law students. All freshmen are required to 'take
tests in these two areas to determine if any problems exist. In the
exposition half of the program, those with the poorest test perform-
ance (the bottom 50 students) are screened and are broken down
into groups. These sections meet weekly to analyze all aspects of a
selected legal problem. Afterwards, individual conferences are held
with students to discuss their performance.
In the other area of training, articulate persuasion, freshmen
are tested by speech therapists. The students are asked to recite a
passage which incorporates all of the sounds of the English language.
They are evaluated on articulation, voice and rhythm. Thereafter,
the students are rated and assigned to classes where individual atten-
tion is given to each student by a speech therapist. 9
Without going into questionable hypotheses on which many
educational enrichment programs rest, this program addresses most
64. Id. at 355.
65. Diggs, Communication Skills in Legal Materials: The Howard Law School
Program, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 763.
66. Id. at 769. Many studies dealing with the validity of achievement tests and
other indices of success cast serious doubt on their predictive validity. E. G. Gos-
fin, The Search for Ability: Standardizing Testing in Social Perspective, Part II,
Ability Tests and Prediction i23-65 (1960); Toepfer, Harvard Special Summer
Program, 18 J. Legal Ed. 443, 451 (1966); Carl and Callahan, Negroes and the
Law, 17 J. Legal Ed. 250, 256-60 (1965); Ramsey, Law School Admissions: Sci-
ence, Art or Hunch?, 12 J. Legal Ed. 503 (1960).
67. Id. at 769, 778-79.
68. The program is named after Paul Diggs, a former Howard University Law
Professor, who initiated the project. In the original program, all instruction was
tied to a program called "Communication Skills." Also, the program was broad-
based, focusing on all students.
69. This information is based on conversations with Dr. Elizabeth Stone, Di-
rector of the Speech Division of the Communication Skills Program, and Mr. John
Vartoukian, Communication Skills Specialist in Writing Division of the Program,
December 9, 1976.
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educational imperatives related to methods and facilities for educat-
ing students in the skills of the law.70 It contemplates that students
will be taught; students will be motivated; students will learn.71
Can we quantify the impact such programs have upon students?
For example, is a student's confidence in himself undetermined by
the inference that he is in law school because of his race? In a
highly instructive article, James McPherson states:
. . . [M]y mind tells me, if I allow myself to take advan-
tage of my color and seek enrollment as a black student . . .
[that] I . . . [ensconce] myself within . . . a category that: (a)
compel[s] me to accept tutorial help that [suggests], in my
mind and in the minds of my classmates, the distance between
my ability and my academic responsibility; (b) force[s] me to
become a personal symbol . . . of how paternal and liberal the
society is, and how much it is willing, in special cases like my
own, to overlook glaring deficiencies in my academic preparation
. . . to make a lawyer of me; (c) force[s] me to question,
almost daily, the comparative validity of every good grade I
received, every bad grade I received, every friendship I made,
every friendship I lost, every kindness extended to me, and
every kindness withheld .... 72
70. That was Professor Diggs' intention.
71. Id.
72. McPherson, Do you See What I See: Two Writers Look at CLEO, 1970
U. Tol. L. Rev. 579-80.
Many minority law students view the highly competitive and somewhat artificial
law school world as an alien and hostile environment, populated by law teachers
and students who in dozens of ways patronize, offend and disdain them. In this
environment, they are forced to confront on the law school level what W.E.B. Dubois
described as the "duality" of being Black in America.
As law students they must be able to discuss slavery in dispassionate terms
and legalese. As Blacks, they are haunted by the residue of that most insidious insti-
tution.
As law students they must ingest and internalize for later regurgitation the oper-
ative elements of "probable cause," "reasonable suspicion" and "due process." As
Blacks, their personal experiences belie the efficacy of these concepts.
As law students they must approach the study of law with the same single-mind-
edness of their white counterparts. As Blacks they are subjected to the real or
imagined pressure to translate immediately very minimal knowledge into positive
action.
As law students, they must compete as individuals for grades, jobs and personal
gratification. As black law students they are aware that their individual perform-
ances are doubly important in that they are watched, monitored, analyzed and trans-
lated into statistical arguments for or against the future admission of minority stu-
dents. See Smith, Double Exposure, 2 Learning and the Law 24 (1975).
1977] Comments
HOWARD LAW JOURNAL
If this is the effect of the programs thus far discussed; if this is the
reality a disadvantaged student must face, how can one change that?
The student, of course, must be the provocateur of change. He must
wrestle with his identity and hopefully assemble feelings and
attitudes that are positive to justify his existence in a law school.
The law school as well has a notable role to play. First of all,
it must stimulate the student's conscience. Derrick Bell has written
an enlightening article on this area.73 The primary goal of every law
school, he says, is to insure that each student is taught THE LAW.
74
If this standard is applied to white students, no less demanding stand-
ards should be applied to Blacks. 75  The school should take great
pains to convey as specifically as possible what is expected: a step-
by-step breakdown of the performance the law school requires will
help the ambivalent student decide whether he wants to embark on
so rigorous an undertaking. The notice should convey (more cer-
tainly than any "pep talk" by the dean) the school's belief that the
student admitted is capable -of the performance demanded of him. 76
Given an understanding from the outset of what constitutes accept-
able performance, with ample opportunity for frequent and precise
reviews of his progress, most students in need of help will seek it
themselves.
77
Bell's suggestion is a good one.78 It is a plea that a school
recognize that it has admitted a number of students who have great
potential for service to the law, that they are experiencing uncertain-
ties and may have special handicaps not shared by white students;
and that whatever the handicap or the uncertainty, they must be
taught.
V
Will there be a change in education? If it comes it will arrive
73. Bell, Black Students in White Law Schools: The Ordeal and the Oppor-
tunity, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 539.




78. We can build on this. If a disadvantaged student is going to cope with legal
instruction, law schools have to experiment. Classes with several teachers and a
single student; classes with several teachers and a group of students; students orga-
nized into temporary task forces and project teams; students shifting from group work
to individual work-all these and their permutations will have to be employed to
give our disadvantaged student a taste of what he has to face.
[Vol. 20
on the wings of a decision which society makes in favor of equity.
Lyndon Johnson spoke of it. He dreamed of a society that
emphasized equity-an affluent society that called for sacrifice by
the majority to bring out the talents and willing cooperation of a sub-
merged and disadvantaged minority.7" William Graham Sumner
expressed a similar sentiment ninety years ago.8 0 Every man, ac-
cording to Sumner, owes it to himself, to his community, and to those
who are at once weak and wronged, to go to their aid. Whenever a
social arrangement injures someone and he is humbled by the ex-
perience, it is the duty of those who are stronger or who know better
to fight for redress.8 ' We owe each other rights-rights that do not
pertain to results, but to chances." If we help a man to help himself
by opening the opportunities around him, we put him and perhaps
his group in a position to add to this nation's wealth.
83
Realistically, however, emphasizing equity without knowing
whether there is support for it, or creating opportunities for some-
one without knowing the social realities"4 may open few, if any,
opportunities for minorities. In this country, prosperity and the
social opportunities attendant thereto have shifted away from prop-
erty in real estate to property in one's work.8 5 Under these changing
circumstances, new ideas are needed to illuminate the rights and
opportunities associated with work. Laws are needed to ensure that
people will accord them proper respect. There are many ways of
doing this and numerous devices available for applying these ideas to
higher education.80 In the world of education, some Blacks are
79. Lampman, What Does It Do for the Poor-A New Test for National Pol-
icy, 34 Pub. Int. 66 (1974).
80. Sumner, What Social Classes Owe to Each Other 162 (1883).
81. Id. at 162-63.
82. Id. at 163-65.
83. Id. at 166.
84. Raspberry, Affirmative Action in Good Times and Bad, The Washington
Post, May 30, 1975, at A25, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Raspberry].
85. See Braybrooke, Three Tests for Democracy 45-81 (1968).
86. (a) Definitions:
(I) X is a paradigm for people who work for someone else.
(2) Y is a paradigm for people who employ X.
(b) Situation:
(1) X works for Y.
(2) The work which X performs produces income which promotes the
welfare of X.
(c) Rules:
(1) If the work done by X produces income which promotes the wel-
fare of X, X is entitled to dominion and control over that income.
(2) The work performed by X presupposes a right to work.
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denied essential training, and yet, except for the Law School Admis-
sions Test (LSAT), and the manner in which it is utilized by some
institutions, twenty percent of those eliminated could successfully
complete law school work."' Why should we permit this practice
to persist? Why should educational opportunities be limited?
The Bakke case is an illustration of what can happen.8 a On
September 16, 1976, the California Supreme Court struck down a
minority admissions program administered by a state medical school.
It announced that the program unconstitutionally denied educational
benefits to a nonminority applicant whom the school acknowledged
(3) If the right to work presupposes some training, and some X's are










Group B Group A
Reject -- -* Accept
This diagram is an illustration of Robert Thorndike's alternative definition of cultural
fairness. Thorndike, Concepts of Culture-Fairness, 8 J. of Educ. Measurement
63 (1971). This diagram originally appeared in Linn, Fair Test Use in Selection,
43 Rev. of Educ. Research 139, 147-48 (1973).
88. 132 Cal. Rptr. 680; 553 P.2d 1152 (1976).
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had better credentials than selected minority candidates. A lit-
eral reading of the fourteenth amendment lends support to the
claim that Bakke (a white applicant) was a victim of discrimination.
That is plainly an injustice. Yet that injustice must be weighed
against a greater injustice; the certain and systematic exclusion of
Blacks and other minorities from graduate schools if preferential pro-
grams are eliminated. Quite obviously, we have no clear answer
to the question of whether minority programs can survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. Dejunis v. Odegaard9 and the recent decision by
the New York Court of Appeals in Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Center, 0 demonstrate that the matter is still open. However, two
things are certain: First, the state cannot use race to invidiously dis-
tinguish between its citizens.9 Second, race may be used by the
state to promote a proper governmental objective. 2
The case which is similar on the facts is Porcelli v. Titus.
93
White teachers claimed the denial of their rights under the four-
teenth amendment because color was used as a factor in the hiring
of new faculty. Of course, the state upheld the minority hiring pro-
gram. It applied the permissive standard of judicial review. State
action, according to the court, based on considerations of color, when
color is not used per se, is not necessarily a violation of the four-
teenth amendment. 4
Candidly, the Constitution is both color blind and color con-
scious. A classification which denies a person a benefit, or causes
him harm must not be based on race.95 In that sense, the Constitu-
tion is color blind. Where race is used to prevent the perpetuation of
discrimination or to undo the effects of past humiliation, the Consti-
tution must be color conscious.9" To suggest that it should be other-
wise would lend support to what the nation has decided is a national
disgrace.
89. 82 Wash. 2d 11; 507 P.2d 1169, vacated on rehearing, 529 P.2d 438 (1974).
90. 384 N.Y.S.2d 82; 348 N.E.2d 537 (1976).
91. E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 487 (1954); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
92. E.g., Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Norris v. State Council of Higher Education, 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971).
93. 431 F.2d 1254 (3rd Cir. 1970).
94. Id. at 1257.





Thankfully, this case is of limited application. It covers those
instances where quotas are used to promote opportunities for minori-
ties. It says nothing about what private institutions may do, nor the
political ramifications of nonrepresentation of minorities (e.g. law-
yers) in a deliberative democracy.9" Under these circumstances,
both state and private institutions can establish an admissions proce-
dure which takes account of merit and the needs of a disadvantaged
group without offending any constitutional guarantees.
To be sure, this case is a cause for alarm. It is a quantification
of an attitude shared by some Americans that the chapter on integra-
tion should be closed. There are a number of grounds upon which
this case can be discredited. First, the court's complete misinterpre-
tation of the legislative history behind the fourteenth amendment;'-
second, the court's equation of racial classification used by the
medical school with invidious classifications used by a number of
states;"' ' and third, the court's misunderstanding that the students ad-
mitted under the special admissions programs were unqualified for
medical training.
The simple truth revealed by Bakke is that any remedy for the
inequities flowing from past discrimination will inevitably have some
impact upon nonminority groups. Whenever there is a limited pool
of resources from which minorities have been disproportionately
excluded, equalization of opportunity can only be accomplished by
a reallocation of resources. Those who have previously enjoyed a
disproportionate advantage must give some of that up if those who
have historically had less are to be afforded an equitable share.
Two centuries of slavery and racial discrimination have left our
nation with festering suspicions, and a separated society in which
wealth, educational resources, employment opportunities-indeed
all of society's benefits-are in the hands of white Americans.
Until recently, most attempts to overcome the effects of that history
have proved unavailing. In the past decade, the implementation of
numerous affirmative action programs much like the one challenged
in Bakke, have resulted in some degree of integration in public
97. See Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. Negro Ed. 49 (1935).
See also, Styles, Negroes and the Law 232 (1937).
98. See, e.g., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873); Bickel, The Original
Understanding of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
99. 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 703-06 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 20
higher education. Of course, the federal courts have taken steps to
promote this. In 1976, it is anomalous that the fourteenth amend-
ment which served as an instrument for requiring integration in
secondary education should now be used as a device to restrain
graduate schools from voluntarily seeking that very same objective.
William Raspberry may be a prophet. He wrote, "A few years
from now, when people ask you whatever happened to affirmative
action, tell them it got crushed to death between hard times and
lawyers."1 °  Fortunately, there are positive ways open to us today
to avoid having to say that tomorrow.
100. Raspberry, note 84.
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